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5 January 1994

The Honorable David R. Hinson
Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
U. S. Department of Transportation
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D. C. 20591

 

Dear Mr. Hinson:

 

In May of 1985 the FAA was notified by Mr Jerry Wells and Norman L. Horton that the fuel system of the Piper PA-23 (all series) did not meet the requirements of the regulations under which they were certified. The failure was that water could be trapped in the after inboard corner of each tank which could not be detected nor eliminated by the procedures of a normal preflight inspection. The amount of water trapped in each tank was far in excess of the capacity of the gascolator which could, and did, cause engine failure….sometimes double engine failure.

 

The FAA did not agree with our analysis, nor did they give credence to our actual tests conducted on aircraft. All they did was to examine the original drawings of an aircraft and reply that we were wrong. The FAA refused to examine an aircraft.

 

It took almost three years and a double congressional inquiry for the FAA to agree to test an aircraft, as we had repeatedly done, and discover that our tests and conclusions were correct.

 

Over the intervening years, nothing constructive has been done to correct this design error on these aircraft As a result of this callous disregard for the safety of general aviation, aircraft are being lost and people have perished unnecessarily.

 

This lack of action has been called to the attention of the FAA by us and the NTSB many times over. In April of 1991, after a telephone conversation with Mr. H. Trammell of the Atlanta FAA office, we decided that ordinary citizens could not force the FAA to correct an original error in certification no matter what…..even when the FAA admitted that we were correct. Apaches and Aztecs are still crashing and killing people because of failure of the FAA to require drains in the after inboard corner of each of these tanks…..a simple and relatively inexpensive procedure.

 

In December of 1993 Mr. Wells and I were asked to examine the wreckage of a PA-23, N54746, S/N 7554059 which crashed on 26 July 1991 near Manteo, North Carolina, killing Dr. Frank Calabro and his wife Ruth. (NTSB Identification: ATL91FA142 [SumpThis].)

This accident had been previously investigated by Mr. Roff H. Sasser of the Atlanta NTSB office. Mr. Sasser was supposedly aided by an expert from the FAA named Jeff Halliday and an expert from the engine manufacturer, Textron Lycoming, named James F. Brown. Their conclusions were published in an NTSB report.

Mr. Wells and I examined what was recovered of the wreckage on 2 and 3 December 1993 in Shirley, Long Island, New York where the wreckage is now stored.

The investigation conducted by the NTSB field investigator, aided by "experts" from the FAA and the engine manufacturer, was , at best, incomplete, and at worst, shockingly incompetent. The report submitted to the Board was so poor that the Board's findings of accident causes is improper, misleading, and just plain wrong.

To attempt a listing of the errors and omissions of the investigation in this letter would literally be an outline of a course in basic aircraft accident investigation, and no such attempt will be made here. Suffice it to point out that Mr. Sasser misinterpreted physical evidence, failed to observe physical evidence, failed to explore the weather to which this aircraft had been subjected, failed to properly question all kinds of witnesses, failed to safeguard portions of the wreckage, and otherwise exhibited a lack of competence which is unforgivable in a person entrusted with his important position.

Mr. Sasser and his advisers either did not look for obvious signs of the cause of engine failure, or they did not know how and where to look for these signs. Further, they did not know how to interpret physical evidence plainly visible in the propellers and on the spinners, or they didn't take the time to do so.

The real causes of this accident were not officially reported to the Board. Hence, the statistics published by the Board and the FAA will be in error by at least this accident. If this investigation is typical of all general aviation accident investigations then all of the accident statistics are suspect.

Our opinion as to the cause of this accident is supported by the physical evidence still contained in the wreckage and by photographs taken during our examination. This evidence will be made available to the NTSB and the FAA if so requested. However, knowing the defensive attitude of the FAA, as shown by their letter to us of November 2, 1987, we insist on retaining control of any and all hardware concerned in this accident. Some of this evidence is delicate and perishable and could be destroyed by mishandling. This we cannot allow.

In no way do we wish to repeat the series of correspondence which started in 1985 and continued for six years…..which was an exercise in frustration. All we ask, nay, now demand, is that the FAA take the necessary action to insure that drains are properly installed in all PA-23 tanks so that entrapped water may be eliminated prior to flight. Some manufacturers think this advisable. Read the O'Brien Report written by a Cessna engineer.

Further, it would be reasonable for the FAA to review all general aviation aircraft for compliance with the regulations on water problems. They should studiously avoid dependence on original drawings for conclusions as to compliance.

Remember the Leaning Tower of Pisa.


Respectfully,

Norman L. Horton


Jerry L. Wells

 

cc.
Interested parties

 


 

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