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21 December 1989

The Administrator Federal Aviation Administration U. S. Department of Transportation 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

Dear Sir;

More than five years ago Mr. Jerry Wells and I, Norman L. Horton, wrote to the FAA concerning the failure of certain general aviation aircraft to meet the requirements under which they were certified. Among others, the Piper PA-23 dismally failed to meet the requirements of CAR 3.444 (c) and CAR 3.553.

This had been earlier reported by submission of an M or D form to the appropriate field office but no corrective action was taken by the FAA. The owner of the aircraft concerned was harassed by an FAA inspector for a design deficiency in his aircraft which he could not correct. The FAA took no visible action to correct this life threatening deficiency in the fleet of aircraft still flying.

A series of letters over the intervening years between the FAA and us followed. A TV film was personally presented to the FAA in Kansas City in January of 1986 pointing out this deficiency in this and other aircraft. There was little interest in the film and absolutely no response. More letters were written to the FAA and the NTSB, who responded with sympathy and encouragement, but nothing of consequence from the FAA.

Finally after a strong letter to the Director, Central Region, and some Congressional inquiry, the FAA was shamed into actually looking at an aircraft rather than just asking the manufacturer if his aircraft met the minimum standards set forth in the regulations. This action was given a positive push by the NTSB on December 30, 1987 by a letter to the FAA containing Safety Recommendations A-87-127 through -130.

Finally on February 18, 1988 we received a letter saying that a test had been conducted on a Piper PA-23 and indeed our contention that undrainable fluid was trapped in the after inboard corner of each tank was correct. The amount was not specified, but a letter from the owner of the aircraft used in the test described the amount as 3½ times the volume of the gascolator. That is in substantial agreement with our discoveries and reports and is deadly if flight is attempted with this amount of water in the tank.

The FAA promised us results by March 31, 1988. None were forthcoming.

On Thursday 21 September 1989 I called Mr. Robert Alpiser in Kansas City to ask the status of the project to correct the deficiency in the PA-23. I was informed that this problem had been turned over to the Atlanta office. I then called Atlanta and spoke with Mr. Bob Goodall. He promised me results in 30 to 45 days. Mr. Goodall must have retired from office, I have heard not one word and we are 45 to 60 days overdue.

We are now in mid-winter and when spring comes, or before, the PA-23 fleet will fly again and as sure as new leaves appear on the trees in spring, some PA-23 will crash because of undrainable water in the tanks.

Mr. Wells and I have knowledge of this problem and its cure. We have done our best to inform the appropriate governmental and private agencies of our concern. We feel responsible, in part, for the loss of life and property that we know could have been and could still be saved by corrective action on the part of the FAA and the manufacturer of the aircraft.

Knowing how to save lives but being throttled by bureaucratic organizational inertia or the apparent lack of concern by the very agency charged with the responsibility of aviation safety is frustrating beyond acceptance.

We know very well that this project is small compared to the responsibilities of air traffic, airline hijacking, commercial airline crashes, and other political and organizational problems facing the FAA. Still, there is a simple and direct solution which can be implemented by a run of the mill AD. If that AD can save one life or one airplane the economic impact would be less than the cost of one lawsuit.

Manufacturers complain of the high cost of liability insurance, and we agree in part with their concern, but when they refuse to take action to prevent accidents which create this liability, such a position is untenable and self destructive. The FAA, ideally, could aid in correcting this catch 22 situation by issuing corrective instructions and procedures to overcome known safety problems. But these instructions and procedures must be timely or their affect is lost by attrition.

But, the problem of the PA-23 is still uncorrected. Evaluation and planning has been going on for more than five years. When is some action going to be taken to correct the hardware? If action is not taken to correct this problem the PA-23 fleet should be grounded to protect the lives of those flying in them.

We eagerly await your response.

		Sincerely, Norman L. Horton Jerry L. Wells
cc: Interested parties

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