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20 January i988

An Open Letter to:

The Honorable T. Allan McArtor Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

Dear Mr. McArtor:

In a recent aviation publication a letter to the editor expressed some opinions about the cost of Airworthiness Directives that inferred problems existed much deeper than just who pays for the cost of an AD.

The basic question asked was: If an aircraft, certified by the manufacturer (DOA), with the tacit approval of the FAA, leaves the factory in a condition which does not meet the requirements of the Federal Air Regulations under which it was certified, why must the aircraft owner pay to bring this aircraft up to minimum FAR standards at a time, after purchase, when the FAA discovers and admits that a defect does exist ?

Good question........no answer. The aircraft must meet the minimum criteria, so the repair must be accomplished. But, WHY must the owner pay for it ?

What should be the role of the FAA in these situations ? Is the fact that the aircraft reached the marketplace in a defective condition and yet "certified" a reflection on the competence of the FAA ? Or, is it likely that the defect was actually unknown to all concerned…even the manufacturer ? Could it be that the design was actually state of the art when manufactured and the defect is only a failure to maintain the aircraft properly ?

But the owner seldom maintains his own aircraft. An FAA licensed mechanic does that, and if he follows the FARs his maintenance restores the aircraft to a like new state, ("equal to the original", FAR 43.13 (b) ). Common sense tells us that this is impossible. But, in a purely technical sense, every aircraft, after maintenance, is in violation of the written regulations.

Be that as it may, let us take a hypothetical case….. A specific type of aircraft is discovered to have a design defect which puts it in direct violation of the FARs For example, an aircraft with bladder tanks is discovered to be unable to drain all the fluid in the tanks through the sediment bowl as required by CAR 3.444 (c) and FAR 23.971 (a) (2), whichever applies. More than 20 years after the original manufacture of these aircraft the FAA determines that the defect exists and they publish an AD on the subject. The manufacturer has designed kits that must be installed to correct the defect. According to the AD, if the kits are installed and the procedures are followed the problem will be solved. The cost could run over $2000 under the worst conditions. The procedures outlined in the AD are so vague that there arises a great difference of opinion in the field as to what they mean and how to accomplish them. Every mechanic has his own ideas and he does it his way. He then signs off the AD in the log book as having been complied with. (As it turns out, this AD did not solve the hypothetical problem anyway).

There are several things here that seem inconsistent:

1. Why didn't the FAA discover this design defect by appropiate tests before certification ?

2. Granted that #1 above did not occur, then why did it take so many years for the FAA to do sometning about it ? During all those years accidents were occurring because of the defect. STCs were issued to after market manufacturers to assist in alleviating the problem. Yet, the original manufacturer kept cranking out defective "certified" aircraft.

3. Who really should pay for correcting the defect ? The FAA certainly doesn't. The manufacturer seldom does. The owner is stuck by the regulations. Either comply with the AD or sell your airplane for scrap.

Now this hypothetical is carried to extreme and couldn't really happen........or could it ?

If this hypothetical case is even remotely possible, some thing is wrong here. It seems as if the FAA is operating in direct violation of the basic management principle of authority and responsibility. The FAA requires pilots to comply with the regulations or they will lift the pilot's certificate. Responsibility to obey the rules goes with the authority to fly an airplane. The FAA tells manufacturers of aircraft that they must obey the regulations also. But what happens when a manufacturer does not do so ? The FAA issues an Airworthiness Directive and, in effect, punishes the pilots by lifting their wallets. The manufacturers make more money on the kits sold to correct the defect. The FAA exhibits no responsibility for certifying this defective airplane. Yet, they have total authority in the matter of repair procedures and the financial burden usually falls on the shoulders of the owners.

So, in this hypothetical case, the FAA has failed to meet the first requirement of guaranteeing the general aviation population that certified aircraft are safe to fly, or that they in fact comply with the FARs. Secondly, delays in discovering defects in aircraft result in unnecessary loss of life and property. And thirdly, when defects are finally admitted, are proper corrective measures taken by the FAA ? Regretfully, not always.

Sometimes the manufacturers do a better job when the FAA is left completely out of the action loop. A case in point is the relocation of the air inlet of the Mooney. Another is the action taken on the Piper Malibu by the new owner, M. Stuart Millar, before the FAA could possibly have moved. There are other examples where the manufacturer acts promptly and responsibly to correct deficiencies in his aircraft. There are also examples of the opposite where the manufacturer fights any change to the bitter end….all the while denying that his aircraft has any defect, in spite of statistics to the contrary. He claims that all of the accidents are "pilot error". The pilots intentionally or otherwise fly the aircraft outside the envelope and exceed the limitations of the aircraft. And yet, during all the years of this argument, the FAA issues STCs to after market suppliers to correct the denied defect. Even so, the FAA does not require the manufacturer to make any changes in the aircraft concerned.

There must be an echo in this business…..seems to me I've heard that song before.

If the FAA has neither the legal nor the moral responsibility to guarantee the aviation public that an aircraft is indeed safe and does in fact meet the minimum requirements of the FARs, then what is the reason for the intrusion of the FAA into that sector of aviation. They must serve a more active role than spectator or even umpire or get out of the game completely. If general aviation must have many accidents and the loss of many lives to convince the FAA that corrective action needs to be taken, we will never approach a cure for the problem. We can't afford this type of "blood priority". Merely correcting past mistakes makes no guarantee for the future. Fault tree analysis in design and manufacture is a well established technique, and it is cheaper than "blood priority" in the long run.

This situation, in part, is what has led general aviation into the present recession. This plays a part in the high insurance rates that seem to stifle manufacturing. This is also partly responsible for the glut of court cases that the manufacturers blame for their dilemma. This is a prime case study of mis-management.

Whose mis-management ? There is plenty of it to go around, but at this point it wont help to point accusing fingers or assess blame What is needed is an overhaul of the system from regulations to conception, through design, manufacturing, testing and marketing. Until both the FAA and the manufacturers recognize this need, general aviation as we know it will gradually eliminate itself from our society. Then we can all go off and join the pterodactyls.

A gloomy and pessimistic point of view ? Yes. But it may not come to pass. There are rays of hope. Piper is blazing new paths. Research is alive and well in the propulsion field. Mooney is bustling with new ideas. New faces and new names are on the horizon. Even Beech and Cessna could renew their interest in general aviation aircraft. Those wonderful names should not be allowed to vanish from the scene.

But first and foremost, the FAA must re-evaluate it's position in general aviation. If they are to control with authority, then they must accept the consequences of that control. They must become an active member of the industry and not just play policeman. The Atlantic City facility is a great start. But management by fear is counterproductive in the long run…..as we now see. Granted, the FAA has limited resources, and as taxpayers we should applaud and uphold those limits. But the FAA must learn to tap the resources of the country, the organizations and individuals who have special knowledge of the problems involved, and this includes the NTSB. The FAA must learn to listen, really listen, not just pay lip service to these organizations and individuals. They must absorb, analyze and then use the information which is available.

Until and unless major change occurs within the FAA there is only a glimmer of hope that the general aviation picture will improve to any degree in the foreseeable future.

The imagination, the intelligence, the energy, the desire, the designs and the people are all out there now. Who is going to put it all together ?

Respectfully, Norman L. Horton Jerry L. Wells

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