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14 December 1987 |
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Mr. Paul K. Bohr |
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Dear Mr. Bohr: |
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Your letter of November 2, 1987 has been received. Much thought and analysis has gone into that letter and your previous letter of September 23, 1987. |
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The September 23 letter tells us that "the PA-23/23-160 fuel system is in literal compliance". That sentence, and one additional sentence which states that "fuel contamination in PA-23 fuel tanks has not been established as an unsafe condition, the FAA will continue to monitor service experience", led us to believe that the FAA would take no action concerning what we have determined to be not only a dangerous condition, but a fatal flaw in the system. |
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As to our response, you must attempt to put yourself in our position after we received such information. We felt as if we were children being chastised by an over protective parent. We had no knowledge that your original writing of that letter should have read "NOT in literal compliance". That is not what we received. |
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Hence, our letter of 16 October 1987. |
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We were not intentionally offensive nor inflammatory. And, upon re-reading that letter I do not find it so. I do find it factual and strongly to the point….and that was intentional. It is sad that the printed word cannot carry with it any tonal inflection or body language to add color and conviction to the meaning. |
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Since your last letter we have received two telephone calls from Bob Alpiser of your organization. He graciously invited us to Kansas City to meet with the group that you have appointed to look into our allegations. Unfortunately we could not attend the meeting since both of us were required to be in Natchitoches, Louisiana to testify about a water problem in a Cessna 210E. Incidentally, the jury found that the engine stoppage in the subject accident was indeed caused by water. Both the FAA and the NTSB failed to find the water in the accident and the statistics will be in error by at least this one accident. However, neither the FAA nor the NTSB investigator looked for water in this accident. It was in plain sight in the reservoir tanks, the selector valve, the vapor return line, the gascolator and copious signs in the fuel distributor. None of these components had been examined until we did so after the FAA and the NTSB had completed their examinations. |
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We have had many similar experiences regarding water in the fuel accidents when the official investigators fail to look for or find water. Even when the possibility of water in the fuel system is admitted, corrective action is usually late and sometimes ineffective. A case in point is the high winged Cessna problem (whether bladder equipped or not) and the issuance of AD84-10-01. After the effective date of that AD and up to November 7, 1987 there have been many fuel contamination accidents in high winged Cessna aircraft effected by AD84-10-01. The question becomes simply what good did the AD accomplish? |
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This discussion may seem far removed from the PA-23 water problem, but it is not. We fear that if the FAA treats the PA-23 problem as it has treated the high winged Cessna problem, general aviation will be no safer in the long run. If general aviation is going to survive as we now know it, the accident rate must be reduced. |
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One way to reduce that accident rate is to assure the flying public that the aircraft they fly are as systems safe as can be designed and constructed. Private flying may never reach a zero accident rate, but it must become less hazardous than motorcycle riding or it will eliminate itself. |
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If, as you state, there are still 2000 PA-23s flying, what better way could be proposed to keep them flying than to install quick drains in the low spot of each of their fuel tanks, and, be certain that all pilots who fly them are instructed to properly drain each of these quick drains in addition to the gascolators before the first flight of each day and after each refueling. |
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How much could that cost ?? For sure, a lot less than a jury just awarded a paraplegic in Natchitoches, Louisiana. |
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Our invitation to you and your staff to visit our shop in Auburn, Washington still stands. We can demonstrate to you how just a few drops of water can cause an aircraft to crash…. and it has happened in just that fashion. Less than a teaspoon of water in the right place at the right time can bring an aircraft out of the sky with fatal results. Why are such systems still allowed to fly without alterations ?? |
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We still want to work with the FAA, the NTSB and the aircraft manufacturers in the interest of flight safety and accident prevention, but, we are only privately funded. Our resources are limited. We must wait for an accident to occur to provide the funding to do the proper research to prove that a bad design or a poor system is in fact installed in a certified aircraft. Once we prove our point, either in court or out of court, we are immediately branded as turncoats to the profession, hired guns, or what ever else you may hear. Yet, all we are trying to do is make flying safer for everyone, ourselves included. |
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We approach you again with that philosophy as our sole motivation. We, at times may speak bluntly and directly to the point. We do not intend to anger the very organization that can help attain our goals….i.e. flight safety. |
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We repeat........ Many aircraft are branded as certified by the FAA when in fact they do not meet the requirements of certification. We point the finger of blame at no one. All we are asking is that the FAA take appropriate steps to correct the situation as best it can considering the practical and economic aspects of each case. |
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However, either fix the aircraft or change the regulations…..there is no honorable alternative. |
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Respectfully,
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